Luis de Guindos: The economic outlook and monetary policy in the euro area
Speech by Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, at the 15th
edition of Spain Investors DayMadrid, 15 January 2025
It is a
pleasure to speak here again this year. [1] In my remarks last year, I
expanded on monetary policy in the face of high inflation risks. The
outlook was then still being shaped by the easing of pandemic-related
supply constraints and by the energy price shock. Inflation had fallen
rapidly from its peak in autumn 2022, but we needed to keep monetary
policy sufficiently restrictive to ensure a timely and sustainable
return of inflation to our 2% target.
Today, the euro area is
in a very different place. Having cut interest rates four times since
last June, by a total of 100 basis points, we have made substantial
progress in bringing inflation back to target. At the same time, the
balance of macroeconomic risks has shifted from concerns about high
inflation to concerns about low growth. The outlook is clouded by even
higher uncertainty, driven by potential global trade frictions,
macroeconomic fragmentation, geopolitical tensions and fiscal policy
concerns in the euro area. As the new year starts, it is imperative to
work towards resolving the various conflicts happening in the world.
Today I will outline how the Governing Council is taking this
uncertainty into account in its assessment of the inflation and growth
outlook, and how a sound financial system is vital in supporting
monetary policy. I will then explain the rationale behind the monetary
policy decisions that we took in December and how we will approach
policy decisions over the coming months. Inflation
The good
news is that the disinflation process is well on track. Headline
inflation came down quickly in 2023 from the double-digit figures we
saw at the end of 2022, as the impact of energy and supply-side shocks
faded. The decline in 2024 was more gradual but clearly in the right
direction, with inflation averaging 2. 4% over the year. The slight
increase in inflation in December owing to energy-related base effects
had been expected. Core inflation also declined over the past two
years, falling from 5% in 2023 to 2. 8% in 2024.
Most measures
of underlying inflation continue to suggest that inflation will settle
near our 2% medium-term target on a sustained basis. One of these
measures, our Persistent and Common Component of Inflation, for
example, which has the best predictive power for headline inflation
over the one to two-year ahead horizon, has been around 2% for more
than a year. Domestic inflation, which closely tracks services
inflation, has edged down, but it remains high (at more than 4%)
mostly because wages and prices in certain sectors are still adjusting
to the past inflation with a delay. Wage growth has also been
moderating.
The December Eurosystem staff projections expect
inflation to average 2. 1% in 2025 and to return sustainably to our
target rather early in the projection horizon. Economic
activity
The outlook for the euro area economy, however,
remains weak and subject to significant uncertainty. Output grew above
expectations in the third quarter of 2024. This was mainly driven by
an increase in consumption, which partly reflect one-off factors that
boosted tourism over the summer, and by firms building up inventories.
The latest information suggests that the economy is losing momentum.
Surveys indicate that manufacturing is still contracting and growth in
services is slowing, as still-high energy prices, regulatory costs and
the lagged effects of previous monetary policy tightening continue to
bite. Firms are holding back on investments, and exports remain weak,
with some European industries struggling to remain competitive. The
labour market remains resilient, with employment growing in the third
quarter of 2024, again by more than expected, and the unemployment
rate remaining at its historical low of 6. 3% in October. Overall, the
December projections see growth in 2024 at 0. 7%.
Looking
ahead, the conditions are in place for growth to strengthen over the
projection horizon, although less than was forecast in previous
rounds. As the catching up of wages continues and as inflation falls,
rising real wages should lead to stronger household spending. More
affordable credit should boost consumption and investment. Provided
trade tensions do not escalate, exports should also support the
recovery as global demand rises. Growth is projected to be just above
1% in 2025 and to move slightly up to modest levels in 2026 and 2027.
Nevertheless, the risks to economic growth remain tilted to
the downside. The risk of greater friction in global trade could weigh
on euro area growth by dampening exports and weakening the global
economy. In particular, the outlook is characterised by high
uncertainty around future trade policies in the United States,
political and fiscal policy uncertainty in some large euro area
countries as well as global geopolitical risks. In fact, over the past
year the European Commission’s uncertainty index has reached its
highest level to date. Furthermore, with formal budget submissions
from several euro area countries still pending, projecting the future
fiscal policy stance is challenging.
This environment of very
high uncertainty could dent confidence and dampen the recovery in
consumption and investment. Such pessimism is visible, for instance,
in consumer expectations. While real household income increased both
in 2023 and 2024 according to national accounts, only little more than
a third of respondents to our latest Consumer Expectations Survey see
their real income as having increased or at least stayed the same.
Whereas only about 10% of households indicate an increase in perceived
real income, in reality more than half of the households surveyed
experienced an increase in their real income, when inflation is netted
out from their self-reported nominal income. [2]Financial
stability
In this volatile economic environment, we see
elevated financial stability vulnerabilities.
High valuations
and concentrated risks leave financial markets vulnerable to adverse
dynamics, which could be exacerbated by non-banks. Non-bank financial
intermediaries have remained resilient to recent bouts of market
volatility, supporting market-based finance in the euro area. However,
broader market shocks could trigger sudden investment fund outflows or
margin calls on derivative exposures. Given relatively low liquid
asset holdings and significant liquidity mismatches in some open-ended
investment funds, cash shortages could result in forced asset sales
amplifying the fall in asset prices. While generally limited, pockets
of elevated financial and synthetic leverage in some entities, like
hedge funds, may add to spillover risks.
Simultaneously,
sovereign vulnerabilities are increasing. Despite recent reductions in
debt-to-GDP ratios in some euro area countries, fiscal challenges
persist in several others. They are exacerbated by heightened policy
and geopolitical uncertainty and structural issues such as sluggish
potential growth. We therefore need to keep monitoring risks to
financial stability carefully, including those stemming from recent
increases in sovereign yields in the United States, the United Kingdom
and, though more moderate, in the euro area.
On a more
positive note, euro area banks are strong. Their resilience has been
underpinned by solid capital ratios, robust liquidity buffers and high
bank profitability. The latter may have reached its peak, however, as
net interest margins are already declining while credit losses are
gradually rising.
In this uncertain macro-financial
environment, preserving bank resilience remains crucial. Existing
releasable macroprudential capital buffer requirements and adequate
borrower-based measures should be maintained to ensure that banks can
absorb any future shocks. At the same time, the policy framework for
non-banks should be improved from a macroprudential perspective to
strengthen the sector’s resilience. Finally, to mitigate the current
risks to sovereign debt sustainability, it is important to implement
the EU’s revised economic governance framework fully, transparently
and without delay. Given the structural challenges related to low
potential growth, the consolidation of public finances will need to be
designed in a growth-friendly way. [3]Conclusion
Let me
conclude. In December we decided to further moderate the degree of
monetary policy restriction, lowering the key ECB interest rates by 25
basis points. This decision was based on our updated assessment of the
inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the
strength of monetary policy transmission. We are also continuing the
process of balance sheet normalisation. In December the last repayment
of the targeted longer-term refinancing operations was completed and
reinvestments were discontinued.
We are determined to ensure
that inflation stabilises sustainably at our 2% medium-term target.
Given the high level of uncertainty, we will continue to follow a
data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the
appropriate monetary policy stance. The high level of uncertainty
calls for prudence. In particular, severe global trade frictions could
increase the fragmentation of the world economy, uncertainty about
fiscal policy and its present challenges could weigh on borrowing
costs, and renewed geopolitical tensions could affect energy prices.
We are therefore not pre-committing to a particular rate path. If the
incoming data confirm our baseline, the policy trajectory is clear,
and we expect to continue to further reduce the restrictiveness of
monetary policy.