Philip R. Lane: Background slides to Policy Panel
Background slides to Policy Panel
“Trade and Financial
Linkages in the Era of Geopolitical Fragmentation”
CEBRA
ITM/IFM joint Program Meeting, hosted by the Central Bank of the UAE,
the Emirates Institute of Finance, and NYU Abu Dhabi
20
November 2023
Philip R. Lane Member of the Executive Board
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Global value chain and
fragmentation Rubric
Euro area imports of intermediate goods
by region
(shares of total imports, deflated)
Asia Europe excl. EU EU excl. EA North America
South
America Africa Oceania
2012
2023
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Sources: Eurostat and ECB staff calculations.
Notes:
See also Di Sano, M. , Gunnella, V. and Lebastard, L. (2023),
“Deglobalisation: risk or reality?”, The ECB Blog, 12 July. The
definition of intermediate goods is based on classification by Broad
Economic Categories (fifth revision). Europe excluding EU includes
Russia. For 2023, the data covers January-August 2023.
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Real imports and sourcing of
intermediate inputs Rubric
Global imports by type of trade
(percentage deviation from steady state)
Sourcing of
intermediate inputs (world)
(percentage points, market share)
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
-30
Flexible
Range
Rigid
Total
Intermediate
Final
100
98
96
94
92
90
Initial
Imports
between
blocs
Imports within blocs
Domestic
sourcing
Final
Sources: Baqaee and Farhi, Asian
Development Bank, FPS database and ECB calculations.
Notes:
See also Attinasi, M. -G. , Boeckelmann, L. and Meunier, B. (2023),
“Friend-shoring global value chains: a model-based assessment”,
Economic Bulletin, Issue 2, ECB. Non-linear impact simulated through
25 iterations of the log-linearised model. In the left chart the grey
areas indicate the range between the flexible setup (yellow line) and
the rigid setup (red line) and provide an illustration of the scope of
the effects associated with the trade shock. The right chart refers to
the flexible setup. The red bar indicates losses in market share while
the green bars indicate gains in market share.
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Change in Gross National Expenditure Rubric
Global GNE
(deviation from steady state, percentages)
Individual countries GNE (deviation from steady state,
percentages)
Flexible
Range
Rigid
Flexible
Range
Rigid
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
-7
Singapore
Vietnam
South Korea
Mexico
Russia
Japan
Euro area
United Kingdom
United States
China
World
World
excluding euro area
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
Sources: Baqaee and Farhi,
Asian Development Bank, FPS database and ECB calculations.
Note: See also Attinasi, M. -G. , Boeckelmann, L. and Meunier,
B. (2023), “Friend-shoring global value chains: a model-based
assessment”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 2, ECB. The non-linear impact is
simulated through 25 iterations of the log-linearised model. In both
charts, the grey areas indicate the range between the flexible setup
(yellow line) and the rigid setup (red line) and provide an
illustration of the scope of the effects associated with the trade
shock.
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Nominal impact
of trade fragmentation Rubric
Consumer prices
(deviation from steady state level, percentages)
Flexible
Range
Rigid
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
United
States China United Kingdom World
Euro area
Wages
(deviation from steady state level relative to medium-skilled
labour, percentage points)
0. 20
0. 15
0. 10
0. 05
0. 00
-0. 05
-0.
10
-0. 15
East
West
Low-skilled
High-skilled
Sources: Baqaee and Farhi, Asian
Development Bank, FPS database and ECB calculations.
Notes:
See also Attinasi, M. -G. , Boeckelmann, L. and Meunier, B. (2023),
“Friend-shoring global value chains: a model-based assessment”,
Economic Bulletin, Issue 2, ECB. Non-linear impact simulated through
25 iterations of the log-linearised model. In the left chart the grey
areas indicate the range between the flexible setup (yellow line) and
the rigid setup (red line) and provide an illustration of the scope of
the effects associated with the trade shock. The right chart refers to
the flexible setup.
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Past and future trends in location of production/operations
Rubric
Last five years
(percentage of respondents)
Next five years
(percentage of respondents)
Into the EU Neither into nor out of the EU Out of the EU
Into the EU Neither into nor out of the EU Out of the EU
All companies
Near-shoring, diversifying
and/or friend-shoring
Near-shoring
Diversifying
Friend-shoring
All companies
Near-shoring, diversifying
and/or friend-shoring
Near-shoring
Diversifying
Friend-shoring
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
Source: ECB.
Notes: See also Attinasi, M. -G. ,
Ioannou, D. , Lebastard, L. and Morris, R. (2023), “Global production
and supply chain risks: insights from a survey of leading companies”,
Economic Bulletin, Issue 7, ECB.
Responses to the question
“How has the location of your company’s production/operations changed
in the last five years and how do you expect it to evolve in the next
five years?” Respondents could choose one or more of the following
replies: Tendency to (i) move more production/operations into the EU,
(ii) move more production/operations out of the EU, (iii) (re)locate
more production/operations geographically closer to the final
production location or country of sales (“near-shoring”), (iv)
diversify production/operations to a greater extent across countries,
(v) (re)locate more production/operations to countries politically
closer to the main country of sales (“friend-shoring”). The category
“Neither into nor out of the EU” captures the responses of firms which
did not signal a tendency to move production either into or out of the
EU.
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Importance of factors for
moving production/operations into or out of the EU Rubric
(percentage of responses)
Into the EU
Out of
the EU
Geopolitical risk/uncertainty Climate change Regulation
Transport costs Financial incentives Access to inputs Energy costs
Local content requirements Tariff requirements Cost of inputs Labour
(cost, skills, shortages) Brexit Informal administrative Geographical
distribution of sales Technological change
-50
-25
0
25
50
75
Source: ECB Notes:
See also Attinasi, M. -G. , Ioannou, D. , Lebastard, L. and Morris, R.
(2023), “Global production and supply chain risks: insights from a
survey of leading companies”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 7, ECB.
Responses to the question “Which of the following factors do you
consider particularly important in relation to recent or planned
future moves of production/operations into or out of the EU?”
Respondents could choose any of the above replies that applied to
their company. Responses are ranked according to the net score (“into
the EU” less “out of the EU”).
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Past and future trends in input sourcing Rubric
Last
five years
(percentage of respondents)
Next five years
(percentage of respondents)
Into the EU Neither into
nor out of the EU Out of the EU
Into the EU Neither into nor
out of the EU Out of the EU
All companies
Near-
shoring, diversifying
and/or friend-shoring
Near-
shoring
Diversifying
Friend-shoring
All
companies
Near-shoring, diversifying
and/or friend-
shoring
Near-shoring
Diversifying
Friend-
shoring
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
Source: ECB.
Notes: See also Attinasi, M.
-G. , Ioannou, D. , Lebastard, L. and Morris, R. (2023), “Global
production and supply chain risks: insights from a survey of leading
companies”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 7, ECB.
Responses to the
question “How has the geographical distribution of your company’s
cross-border sourcing of inputs changed in the last five years and how
do you expect it to evolve in the next five years?” Respondents could
choose one or more of the following replies: Tendency to increasingly
source inputs (i) from inside the EU, (ii) from outside the EU, (iii)
geographically closer to the country of production (“near-shoring”),
(iv) from a more diverse range of suppliers in different countries,
and (v) from countries politically closer to the country of sales
(“friend-shoring”). The category “Neither into nor out of the EU”
captures the responses of firms which did not signal a tendency to
source a higher share of inputs from within or outside the EU.
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Supply chain dependency and
risks by country Rubric
(percentage of responses)
My
company sources critical inputs from this country My company sources
critical inputs from the country, and this is considered subject to
elevated risk More generally, this country poses - or could pose -
risks to supply chains in my sector
80
60
40
20
0
-20
China
United States
Taiwan
India
Brazil
Turkey
Russia
Ukraine
United Kingdom
Source:
ECB Notes: See also Attinasi, M. -G. , Ioannou, D. , Lebastard, L. and
Morris, R. (2023), “Global production and supply chain risks: insights
from a survey of leading companies”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 7, ECB.
Responses to the questions (i) “Does your company presently source
critical inputs which depend (fully or heavily) on supply from a
specific country; and if so, which one(s)?”, (ii) “Do you consider the
supply of critical inputs from this country or any of these countries
to be subject to elevated risk?”, and (iii) “More generally, which
countries (if any) pose – or could pose – risks to supply chains in
your sector?” Countries mentioned by three or more respondents are
included in the chart. Many more countries were mentioned by just one
or two respondents.
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Ease of substitution of inputs and strategies to reduce
country exposure Rubric
Ease of substitution with inputs
originating elsewhere (percentage of respondents)
Implementation of strategies to reduce
country
exposure (percentage of respondents)
Very easy
Easy
Hard
Very hard
No, we have neither adopted,
nor do we intend to adopt, any
strategy
No, but we are
considering
implementing
a strategy in the near future
Yes, mostly by shifting sourcing of
inputs from other
countries located
Yes, mostly by shifting sourcing of
inputs from other countries outside
the same
in the EU
the same
the EU
Yes,
implementing strategies other than those listed above
0
20
40
60
80
0
10
20
30
40
Source: ECB.
Notes:
See also Attinasi, M. -G. , Ioannou, D. , Lebastard, L. and Morris, R.
(2023), “Global production and supply chain risks: insights from a
survey of leading companies”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 7, ECB.
Responses to the questions (i) “In case these inputs were
suddenly no longer available, how easy would it be to substitute them
with inputs originating elsewhere?” and (ii) “Is your firm
implementing or is it planning to implement a strategy to reduce
exposure to the country – or countries – concerned?” The percentages
of responses refer only to those who said that their company presently
sourced critical inputs which depended (fully or heavily) on supply
from a specific country and that they considered to be subject to
elevated risk. A small number of respondents gave more than one
response to question (ii) and these responses have been weighted
accordingly.
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Overall
impact of production location and input sourcing decisions Rubric
Last five years
(percentage of respondents)
Next five years
(percentage of respondents)
Decrease
Unchanged
Increase
Decrease
Unchanged
Increase
80
60
40
20
0
Share of value
added in the EU
Share of
employment in the EU
Average prices
in the EU
80
60
40
20
0
Share of value
added in the EU
Share
of
employment in the EU
Average prices
in the
EU
Source: ECB.
Note: See also Attinasi, M. -G. ,
Ioannou, D. , Lebastard, L. and Morris, R. (2023), “Global production
and supply chain risks: insights from a survey of leading companies”,
Economic Bulletin, Issue 7, ECB.
Responses to the question
“What has been/will be the impact of changes in production location
and/or cross-border input sourcing on your company’s activity,
employment and selling prices in the EU?”
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